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THE STEALTH ASSAULT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:
RAISING THE BARRIERS FOR ANTITRUST INJURY
AND STANDING
Joseph P. Bauer*

The first Annual Conference' sponsored by the American Antitrust
Institute featured a number of prominent speakers2 and explored a number of
important issues.3 The Conference had two principal focuses: substantive
questions of antitrust liability and the future direction of public enforcement
of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and by
the Federal Trade Commission. However, an issue of at least equal

importance was barely discussed, although it has seriously affected the scope
and direction of the antitrust laws. That issue: Private enforcement of the
antitrust laws, and the significant undermining of those efforts by a number
of restrictive recent decisions from the Supreme Court and lower courts.
From the very inception of the Sherman Act in 1890, the statutory scheme
of the antitrust laws has relied on enforcement by the government 4 and private
parties.' Indeed, private plaintiffs are sometimes referred to as "private
*
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A., Univ. of Pa. 1965; J.D., Harvard Univ. 1969.
Member, Advisory Council, American Antitrust Institute. I wish to thank Professors Stephen Calkins,
Andrew Gavil, William Page and Spencer Weber Waller for their comments on an earlier draft of this
Article.
I.
An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2000.
2.
Among the speakers were former Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D.-Ohio), Attorney General
Janet Reno, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky, and Assistant Attorney General Joel
Klein.
3.
Topics included "The Challenge of High Technology," "A New Framework for Collusion,"
"Consumer Choice as a Focal Point of Antitrust Analysis," "The Politics of Antitrust" and "Toward a PostChicago Antitrust for the 21st Century."
4.
Originally, responsibility for governmental enforcement of the antitrust laws was undertaken
solely by the Department of Justice. Since 1914, that responsibility has been shared with the Federal Trade
Commission, which may challenge alleged violations both of the antitrust laws and of "[u]nfair methods
of competition," which are prohibited by Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
5.
Section 7 of the Sherman Act contained a treble damage provision similar to that found in
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890); Clayton Antitrust Act,
ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). The Sherman Act
provision was ultimately repealed by the Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283. See generally
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477. 486 n.10 (1977) (discussing congressional
intent of the Clayton Act's extension of the remedy available); EARL W. KINTNER, I THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES

text of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890).

52 (1978) (reprinting the original
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attorneys general."6 So important is private enforcement that the statute
contains several incentives for private litigants to sue, such as automatic
trebling of damages, plus the award of attorney's fees and costs to the
successful plaintiff from the defendant found to have violated the antitrust
laws.
There are numerous reasons to encourage private enforcement.
Governmental resources are inherently limited, and those scarce resources can
be devoted to other tasks if private parties also police unlawful conduct.
Private parties are usually mostly directly affected by that conduct, and so
they are likely to learn more quickly about the violation. Sound public policy
dictates that those parties who have been harmed by antitrust violations, such
as those forced to pay higher prices because of a price-fixing conspiracy, or
forced out of a market because of exclusionary or predatory behavior, should
obtain compensation therefor. Finally, the prospect of treble damage lawsuits
by the defendant's prospective victims will act as a deterrence to the unlawful
conduct.
The value and changing role of private enforcement are also reflected
statistically. Over the past twenty-five years, private filings have accounted
for the overwhelming majority of all antitrust complaints brought in the
federal courts.7 However, despite the clear value of enforcement of the
antitrust laws by private litigants, the jurisprudence of the past two decades
has erected ever-higher hurdles to private actions. The effect of this caselaw
is reflected by two other statistics: the percentage of filings represented by
private cases, while still high, has been shrinking,' and the absolute number
of private filings has dropped precipitously.9

6.
See, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,557(2000); Klehrv. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179,
199 n.2 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
7.
In the period from fiscal years 1975 to 1999, the percentage of antitrust cases accounted for by
private filings ranged from a high of 95.6% in 1976 to a low of 83.4% in 1990. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics--1999, at 448 tbl. 5.46 (2000), available
athttpJ/www.albany.eduL/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t546.pdf. The percentage for the year ending September 30,
1999, was 88.9%. Id.
8.
In every fiscal year from 1975 to 1986, the percentage of private filings was over 90%, and in
the first six of those years it was always over 93%. Id. From 1987 to 1999, it ranged from a low of 83.4%
to a high of 90.8%, and has been over 90% for only four of those years. Id.
9.
In absolute numbers, the total private filings exceeded 1,000 for each fiscal year between 1975
and 1985, reaching a high of 1,611 in 1977. Id. Since then, the numbers have dropped significantly, to
a low of 452 private filings in 1990. Id. More recently, there were 548 private filings in 1998 and 608 such
filings in 1999. Id. However, for the most recent fiscal year, private filings rose sharply, to 811. Judicial
Business of the United States Courts 2000 Table C-2, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/Contents.htm. This was fueled in large part by a dramatic rise in the
number of antitrust class actions, from 100 in fiscal year 1999 to 213 in the present fiscal year. Id. Table
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Two Clayton Act sections provide for private enforcement of the antitrust
laws. Section 410 permits actions for monetary relief, whereas Section 16"
provides for injunctive relief. As treble damage actions are far more
important, they are the focus of this Article and so it is useful to begin with an
examination of the statutory language permitting these actions: ". . . [A]ny
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . , and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."' 2
A cursory analysis of this provision would suggest that the successful
antitrust plaintiff must prove three elements to sustain a claim for treble
damages: (1) that the defendant violated one or more of the antitrust laws;
(2) that the plaintiff suffered some discernible injury to its "business or
property" from that violation; and (3) that there was some causal link between
the violation and the injury. However, the courts have identified at least two
other necessary elements for a successful private action. First, not all forms
of injury to the plaintiff's business or property qualify for redress. Rather,
only those forms of harm which fall into the category of antitrustinjury are
deemed compensable. 3 Second, only certain plaintiffs are within the
protected group, as numerous potential plaintiffs, whose injury is more
indirect or who are not within the "target" of the defendant's unlawful
conduct, are deemed to lack the requisite standing to bring the action.' 4
I am the co-author of one of the leading treatise series on the federal
antitrust laws.' 5 Three years ago, I completed a volume in that series which
deals with private enforcement, including questions of standing and antitrust
injury. 6 During my research and writing, I was struck by the growing number
of cases which dismissed treble damage actions without even reaching the
merits of the claim, but rather for the perceived failure to satisfy these
elements of a Clayton Section 4 action.'7 At that time, a student asked for a

X-5.
10.
11.

Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15).
Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 730, 737, 15 U.S.C. § 26.

12.

Clayton Act § 4.

13.

See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.

14. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
15.
16.

EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw (11 vols.) (1980-1998).
11 JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw (1998).

17. A brief observation on linguistic precision: Many decisions refer unclearly to an action asserting
a violation of Clayton Section 4. However, although this provision creates private remedies for monetary
relief, it does not define the unlawful conduct. That is found elsewhere, in Section I and Section 2 of the
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potential topic for a directed reading in the antitrust field. I suggested that she
look at this area, with a particular focus on three recent court of appeals
decisions,"8 which I thought took an unduly harsh approach to private
enforcement. 9 Two of these cases and a few others will be discussed in this
Article. As much as selected decisions can serve as anecdotes, they reflect
this unfortunate hostility to private enforcement specifically and to the
antitrust laws in general.
In this Article, I will offer some thoughts on this topic. First, as just
noted, there is significant evidence of judicial inhospitality to private
enforcement. Second, this under-examined aspect of the judicial assault on
antitrust poses a far greater threat to the maintenance of competitive markets
and the prevention of anti-competitive practices than are presented by those
decisions on the merits which have altered the substantive requirements of the
antitrust laws.2" Additional scholarly attention to, and criticism of, this trend
is necessary.2

Sherman Act, and in Section 2, Section 3 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Clayton Section 4 then
incorporates those other provisions by its reference to "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 38 Stat.
at 731.
18. George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 148 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1998); City of
Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 1998); Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d
1166 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999).
19. The student's paper that criticized those cases was subsequently published as a note. See
Heather IC McShain, Note, Still Alive: Antitrust Injury Remains A Part of the Standing Inquiry Under
Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act Despite Three Recent Appellate CourtDecisions, 75 NOTRE DAME
L REV. 761 (1999).
20. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F'C, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999) (rejecting court of appeals'
conclusion that FTC had properly found that professional association's rules, which prohibited certain
forms of advertising, were violative of Section 5 of FTC Act under the "quick look" rule of reason
approach, and instead requiring more extensive rule of reason analysis); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 10 (1997) (holding that maximum resale price maintenance is governed by a rule of reason rather than
a per se standard) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (clarifying that dangerous probability of success is an essential
element of attempt to monopolize claim under Sherman § 2); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (holding that vertical nonprice restraints are to be evaluated under rule of reason rather
than condemned as per se unlawful) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967)).
21. Over the past decade, there have only been a handful of law journal articles concerning general
antitrust injury and standing questions. See, e.g., Maxwell M. Blecher & James Robert Noblin, The
Confluence ofMuddied Waters: Antitrust ConsequentialDamagesandthe Interplayof Proximate Cause,
Antitrust Injury, Standing and Disaggregation, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 145 (1998); Joseph
Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public
Enforcement Goals, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1995); C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust
Remedies: The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Norman
W. Hawker, The New Antitrust Paradox: Antitrust Injury, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 101 (1991); Jonathan M.
Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years ofAntitrust Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo
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The U.S. Supreme Court has considered antitrust injury and standing on
a number of occasions.22 The requirement of showing antitrustinjury23 exists
because although certain activities or structural changes may injure
competition in some markets, and thus may be unlawful because of that effect,
that same behavior may yield benign or even pro-competitive results in other
markets. Furthermore, a core principle of antitrust is that it is designed to
protect competition, and not to protect individual competitors from the effects
of competition. Therefore, an antitrust plaintiff seeking treble damages can
show the requisite antitrust injury only when the harm it suffered is the result
of a reduction in competition.24 As indicated by the Supreme Court, this
requirement is designed to "ensure[] that the harm claimed by the plaintiff
corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the
first place, and it prevents losses that stem from [increases in] competition

Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST LJ.273 (1998); McShain, supra note 19; William H. Page & John Lopatka.
Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy, and the Competitor Plaintiff, 82 IOWA L. REV. 127 (1996) (criticizing
Professor Brodley's article). See also William H. Page, The Scope ofLiabilityforAntitrust Violators, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1445 (1985) (proposing that economic approach, focusing on optimal deterrence, be used
to formulate rules for antitrust injury and standing). One variant of this question, the prohibition on suits
by "indirect purchasers," otherwise known as the Illinois Brick rule, see infra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text, has received slightly more recent attention in the secondary literature. See, e.g., Roger
D. Blair & Jeffrey L Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modem Antitrust Standing
Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L REV. 1 (1999); Chris Coutroulis & D. Matthew Allen, The Pass-OnProblem
in Indirect PurchaserClass Litigation, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 179 (1999); Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Indirect-PurchaserRule and Cost-PlusSales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1990); Michael S. Jacobs, Lessons
from the PharmaceuticalAntitrust Litigation: Indirect Purchasers,Antitrust Standing, and Antitrust
Federalism,42 ST. LoIts U. L.J. 59 (1998); William H. Page, The Limits of State IndirectPurchaserSuits:
Class Certificationin the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1999).
22. The Supreme Court has examined antitrust injury on seven occasions, finding the requirement
unsatisfied in six of those decisions. See At. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990)
(finding an absence of antitrust injury) (discussed infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text); Cargill, Inc.
v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (same); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) (same); Associated Gen'l Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983) (same); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (finding antitrust
injury); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981) (finding absence of antitrust
injury); and Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (same). The Court's
consideration of antitrust standing has been limited to two occasions, and they have split one to one
Associated General (finding absence of standing) and Blue Shield (holding standing requirement was
satisfied).
23. Antitrust injury is discussed in detail in BAUER, supra note 16, at § 78.6.
24. "Plaintiffs must prove antitrustinjury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should
reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation. It should, in short be 'the type of loss that the claimed violations... would be likely to cause."'
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125
(1969)) (emphasis added).
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from supporting
suits by private plaintiffs for either damages or equitable
5
2

relief. ,

Various formulations have been used to identify those plaintiffs who have
standingto assert an antitrust claim: 26 persons whose injury has been "direct,"
whose harm was "foreseeable," who were within the "target area" of the
defendant's conduct, who were within the "zone of interest" protectable by the
antitrust rule in question, and so forth. 27 However, all of these "tests" should
be recognized as constituting different means of limiting the universe of
would-be claimants, by identifying the better (or best) claimants, 28 and then
eliminating other potential plaintiffs who present the risk of duplicative
recovery, or for whom the fact or amount of damages may prove unduly
speculative, or where problems of proof may be particularly complex. Having
said this, it is clear that these rules bar claims by certain parties who have in
fact suffered antitrust injury, because there may be other parties whose injury
is perceived to be more worthy of protection.
29 the Supreme Court stated that
In Associated General Contractors,
determining antitrust standing required an evaluation of "the plaintiff s harm,
the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between
them."3 The Court proceeded to identify a number of factors to consider to
determine whether the particular plaintiff had the requisite standing. 3 These
factors include the existence of a causal connection between the antitrust
violation and the harm to the plaintiff; the defendant's intent to cause that
harm; the nature of the plaintiffs alleged injury;3 2 the directness or
indirectness of the asserted injury; the existence of an identifiable class of
other persons who would be motivated to bring their own antitrust actions for

25. At. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 342.
26. Standing is discussed in detail in BAUER, supra note 16, at § 78.7.
27. See McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 850 n.13 (3d Cir.)
(describing various
"tests"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 825 (1996).
28. Drawing on economic analysis, this is sometimes described as a search for a party which will
be an "efficient enforcer" of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d
1438, 1449-50 (1lth Cir. 1991).
29. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519
(1983).
30. Id. at 535.
31. Id. at 537-45. The Court emphasized that it would be "virtually impossible to announce a blackletter rule that will dictate the result in every case," id. at 536, and that instead it would "identify factors
that circumscribe and guide the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the law affords a remedy in
specific circumstances." Id. at 536-37.
32. Standing is far more likely to be found when the plaintiff is either a consumer or a competitor
in the market in which trade was restrained. Id. at 539.
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the asserted violation; the extent to which the damages claimed are speculative
or would require complex computation; and the potential for duplicative
recovery.33
An important sub-species of the standing requirement is the judicially
created rule that bars "indirect purchasers" from asserting an antitrust claim.
This doctrine, which was announced in the Supreme Court's 1977 Illinois
Brick34 decision, only permits a "direct purchaser" from the defendant to
pursue a claim for treble damages.35 Although Illinois Brick was intended in
part to accommodate the earlier rule first advanced in HanoverShoe,36 that the
defendant could not defend against an action by a direct purchaser by asserting
that the customer had in turn passed on the higher costs to its own customers,
the net effect of these two decisions has been to bar actions by the parties who
not only are most frequently actually injured by the antitrust violations, but
also by those parties who often are most likely to wish to assert a claim.37
These doctrines, and many of the cases interpreting them, are grounded
on a sound public policy, of placing prudential limits both on the number of
private antitrust claims and the persons who may bring them. Taken in the
aggregate, however, the Supreme Court cases," and even more troubling,
many subsequent lower court decisions, also evidence a hostility to the
antitrust laws which makes it far more difficult to protect markets against anticompetitive practices.
Speaking in economic terms, the question is what rules will give us
"optimal" enforcement and deterrence? What rules will yield the best
combination of governmental and private enforcement-of deterring, ex ante,
and challenging, ex post, undesirable conduct or undesirable structural
changes, while leaving alone that which is procompetitive or benign? I
believe that the doctrines that have been formulated are unduly restrictive and
therefore yield sub-optimal enforcement. At the end of this Article, I will

33. Id. at 537-45.
34. Im.Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
35. The Illinois Brick rule is discussed in detail in BAUER, supra note 16, at § 78.8.
36. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
37. The Court has treated the IllinoisBrick rule on two subsequent occasions. In Kansas v. Utilcorp
United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990), the Court rejected an electric utility's attempt to carve out exceptions
to the doctrine and held that it also applied to parenspatriaeproceedings. In Californiav. ARC America
Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), the Court held that IllinoisBrick did not foreclose actions by indirect purchasers
suing under state antitrust laws.
38. As noted above, six of the seven Supreme Court decisions dealing with antitrust injury have
found it lacking in the case at bar, and of the two Supreme Court decisions dealing with standing, the
plaintiff was unsuccessful in the more recent decision. See supra note 22.
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offer a few changes to the present rules, as steps to restore the proper role of
the private sector in enforcing the antitrust laws.
Among my "favorites" in the "parade of horribles" of cases demonstrating
hostility to private enforcement of the antitrust laws are two of the decisions
I mentioned earlier, as the subjects of examination by my former student who
was undertaking a directed reading.39 One of these is from the Third Circuit,
the other from the Eighth Circuit.
In the early 1990's, two utility companies, Allegheny Power System, Inc.
and Duquesne Light Co.,' provided electric power in different portions of the
Pittsburgh metropolitan area. Pursuant to state statutes and regulations in
force at the time, electric utilities had exclusive rights in a territory unless
another utility could show to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
(PUC) that the certificated utility provided inadequate service to customers.4
The City of Pittsburgh embarked on plans to redevelop several urban areas,
which were served exclusively by Duquesne. Because the state legislature had
recently enacted legislation paving the way for competition in the provision
of electric power and Allegheny's rate structure was significantly lower than
Duquesne's, the City filed a petition with the PUC to authorize Allegheny to
provide electric service in the redevelopment areas. Allegheny intervened
before the PUC in support of that application.4 2
Then, lo and behold, Allegheny and Duquesne entered into a contract to
merge. Shortly thereafter, Allegheny withdrew its application to serve as an
additional provider of electricity. In City of Pittsburghv. West Penn Power
Co., the City challenged both the pre-merger agreement, alleging that it
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the merger itself, alleging that it
violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 3 The City sought both injunctive relief
and treble damages, asserting that the agreement and the merger resulted in the
elimination of actual or potential competition for the sale of electricity and
consequent higher rates.' Affirming the district court's dismissal of the
City's lawsuit,45 the Third Circuit collapsed the antitrust injury and standing
questions, and focused on whether there was a causal connection between the
violation alleged and the city's injury.' Finding an absence of the requisite
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 993 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
The court noted that antitrust injury was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of standing,
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causation, the court stressed that competition did not exist between Allegheny
and Duquesne at the time of the challenged agreement, that it was uncertain
whether the PUC would have granted Allegheny's application, and that
therefore one could only speculate whether actual competition had been
foreclosed.47 Rather, the court of appeals asserted that the City's inability to
choose between two suppliers of electricity was the result of the regulated
nature of the utility industry.48
I believe that the court's cramped approach to antitrust injury was at least
in part a reflection of its desire to cut down on antitrust litigation.4 9 However,
it also reflects scepticism of the importance of the role played by the antitrust
laws. Prior to the agreement, not only was the City desirous of competition
for the sale of electricity, and the benefits to consumers that would flow from
it, but Allegheny was desirous of providing that competition.5" It is true that
one does not know for sure that the PUC would have granted the application,
although the recent state legislation evidenced a legislative goal of fostering
competition between electric utilities.5 Thus, it was not unlikely that the PUC
would have granted a certificate to Allegheny. But, one can say for sure that
the challenged agreement absolutely foreclosed the possibility of competition
or the lower rates to electricity consumers that Allegheny was prepared to
offer.52 By denying standing to the City of Pittsburgh to mount an antitrust

and that if the former requirement was not satisfied, there was no need further to examine the latter. W.
Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d at 265.
47. Id. at 268.
48. Id. at 269.
49. The Third Circuit described its inquiry as one of trying to strike "a balance ... between
encouraging private actions and deterring legitimate competitive activity through overly vigorous
enforcement." Id. at 264. In light of the court's explicit recognition that the City had alleged harm to
competition, id. at 263, it is hard to tell what "legitimate competitive activity" might have been deterred
by permitting the city to maintain its challenge to Allegheny's withdrawal of its application to be permitted
to compete with Duquesne.
My concern that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence has encouraged a restrictive attitude
towards private enforcement by the lower courts is exemplified by the Third Circuit's description of the
Associated Generaldecision: "Its approach to the standing inquiry has been interpreted as requiring a
narrowing view, as opposed to the broad remedial purpose approach of cases that preceded it." Id. at 264.
50. Id. at 261.
51. Id. at 260.
52. One of the court's bizarre observations, in rejecting the City's Sherman Section I claim, was
that Allegheny "never did compete, and therefore, any injury to the City did not result from a lessening of
competition." Id. at 266. Apparently the court thought that the only competition protected by the Sherman
Act was actual, or present,competition, for it appeared deaf to the City's claim that the removal of the
potential,orfuture, competition that Allegheny proposed to offer to Duquesne, and which the agreement
foreclosed, was actionable.
In the subsequent portion of the opinion, rejecting the City's Clayton Section 7 claim, the court
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attack on that conduct,53 the court made the agreement and the subsequent

merger immune from judicial scrutiny. Needless to say, that result is
antithetical to the goals of the antitrust laws.

The Eighth Circuit's decision in a challenge by individuals and a
proposed class of popular music fans to certain practices by Ticketmaster is
equally outrageous.' 4 By virtue of long-term exclusive contracts that

Ticketmaster has with almost every promoter of popular music concerts in the
United States, it is a monopoly supplier of ticket distribution or ticket delivery
services to those shows.55 These contracts in turn ensure that Ticketmaster

will have the right to handle the vast majority of ticket sales for almost every
large-scale concert, regardless of whether it has an exclusive contract with the
particular venue where the concert is being held.56 The plaintiffs alleged that

this control allowed Ticketmaster to extract supracompetitive fees for its ticket
distribution services.
The Eighth Circuit relied on the Illinois Brick rule to affirm the district
court's dismissal of the complaint. As noted above,57 that doctrine bars

actions by "indirect purchasers," harmonizing the Supreme Court's earlier
Hanover Shoe decision, which precludes an assertion by the defendant, in a
suit brought by the original, or direct, purchaser, that the overcharge had been
"passed on" by the plaintiff to its own customers.5" Thus, in the Illinois Brick

case itself, the State of Illinois and some county and municipal plaintiffs,
which had made numerous contracts for the construction of facilities in which
brick was one component, were barred from seeking treble damages from the
brick manufacturers, who had sold those bricks to contractors or
subcontractors. It was only those direct purchasers who could maintain an
action for the overcharge.59

recognized that Section 16 of the Clayton Act permits the grant of injunctive relief if the plaintiff shows
"threatened loss" or damage. Id. at 268. But here, the court established a virtually insurmountable
evidentiary barrier for the plaintiff by noting that because it was not certain that the PUC would have
granted the application for Allegheny to provide service in the redevelopment area, "the City will never be
able to prove a direct link between the alleged antitrust violation and their [sic] purported injury." Id.
53. Here, the court could not rely on one of the explanations for denying antitrust standing, that
someone else, waiting in the wings, was likely to mount a challenge and would be a "better" plaintiff.
54. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 865
(1999).
55. Id. at 1168.
56. Because the case was dismissed by the district court on the pleadings, the Eighth Circuit
recognized that all of the plaintiffs' allegations had to be taken as true. Id. at 1168.
57. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
58. Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977).
59. Id. at 745-46.
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These two Supreme Court decisions, and numerous subsequent cases,
make clear that the Illinois Brick rule bars claims by parties further down the
vertical distribution chain from the original purchaser. Under that principle,
it should be clear that these plaintiffs should not have been barred from
asserting a claim, as they were dealing directly with Ticketmaster, buying both
the tickets and the distribution services directly from them. Instead, the
Eighth Circuit created a new, and bizarre, definition of "indirect purchaser":
a person "who bears some portion of a monopoly overcharge only by virtue
of an antecedent transaction between the monopolist and another, independent
purchaser." 6° Although it is true that there was some prior relationship
between the concert venues and Ticketmaster, this was clearly not a situation
where Ticketmaster had created a product and then sold it at an elevated price
to its "direct purchaser," which in turn sold it to the indirect buying plaintiffs.
Here, the plaintiffs dealt directly with the defendant, and paid the overcharge
directly to it. If anything, Ticketmaster was acting as an agent for the venues,
in their sales of tickets to the concert-goers. Furthermore, permitting this suit
to proceed would not have implicated the goal at the heart of Illinois Brick,
preventing duplicative suits by both direct and indirect purchasers. Here, as
the venues did not purchase these services from Ticketmaster, they would
have had no basis for asserting a claim for any overcharge. The consequence
of the Eighth Circuit's holding was that the only private parties who had any
incentive to bring a lawsuit, and any basis for asserting that they were harmed,
were barred from bringing a treble damage action.
In short, this case epitomizes the ultimate, four-step recipe for abuse of
antitrust standing requirements. Start with a bad rule (here, Illinois Brick).
Extend that rule in aberrational ways. Ignore the policies that animated the
establishment of the rule. Finally, misapply the basic rule to the facts.
Without even stirring or baking, the Eighth Circuit's use of this recipe resulted
in the undermining of the goals of the antitrust laws, including, in particular,
the promotion of competition to protect consumer interests.
Although its decisions have not been as outrageous, the Supreme Court
is not immune to criticism regarding its erecting unduly high barriers to
demonstrating antitrust injury and standing. One of the more troubling cases
is its most recent decision in this area, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co.,61 in which the Court held that a retail dealer's loss of profits

60.
61.

Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169.
Ad. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
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resulting from its competitor's implementation of a non-predatory, maximum
vertical resale price program did not constitute "antitrust injury. 62
The defendant was a vertically integrated oil company, selling gasoline
both through its own stations and through independent dealers. The plaintiff
was an independent marketer of gasoline, competing with the defendant at the
retail level. To increase its market share, the defendant offered discounts to
its dealers, but then required them to adhere to maximum retail prices.63
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court concluded that even if the
defendant's conduct was unlawful, the plaintiff had not suffered antitrust
injury. 6 Although the plaintiff may have lost business and profits because the
defendant's program placed a ceiling on the prices charged by the plaintiff's
competitors, its injury only flowed from their lower-but not predatorily
low-prices. Such rivalry on pricing is the essence of competition. 65 As
antitrust injury encompasses only that harm which flows from that which
makes the defendant's acts unlawful,' and as a reduction in prices could
hardly have been the justification for creating a rule making maximum resale
price maintenance illegal, the Court held that it would be improper to allow
a plaintiff to seek treble damages for that kind of harm.67
Justice Stevens' dissent6" identified at least two flaws in the Court's
analysis.69 It is true that low prices are beneficial to consumers, at least in the
short run. However, even if the defendant's and its customers' sustained low
prices were not predatory, they still could have driven the plaintiff out of
business, thereby harming competition and consumers in the long run.7" And,
if the conduct truly violated the antitrust laws, then it was important to
encourage lawsuits by a wider range of plaintiffs, as much to deter wrongdoers
as to compensate injured parties."
I suspect that the majority's determination that the plaintiff had not
sustained antitrust injury was based at least in part on uncertainty about the

62. Id.at 331.
63. Id. at 331-32.
64. Al.Richfield, 495 U.S. at 346.
65. Id. at 345.
66. See supra note 24.
67. Ad. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 331.
68. Id. at 346 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White joined in this dissent.
69. Id. at 346-47.
70. "[N]otwithstanding any temporary benefit to consumers, the unlawful pricing practice that is
harmful in the long run to competition causes 'antitrust injury' for which a competitor may seek damages."
Id. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 360.
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merits of the claim. While maximum resale price maintenance was unlawful
per se at the time of this decision,72 that rule was under strong attack in the
antitrust literature. In Atlantic Richfield, the Court gave what was at best
lukewarm endorsement to the rule,73 and in fact, overruled it only seven years
later.74 Here, rather than confronting the substance of the violation, the Court

unwisely relied solely on principles of antitrust injury to deny recovery to the
injured competitor. In doing so, the Court failed to take full account of the
beneficial role played by private enforcers of the antitrust laws.
A discussion of a few other recent lower court decisions will conclude
this brief review of obstacles placed in the way of private plaintiffs seeking
treble damage recovery. One large collection of cases involves claims against
tobacco companies, asserting various kinds of antitrust conspiracies, including
withholding information or stifling product development, which resulted in
increased expenditures by various entities paying for smokers' health care
costs. The majority of these actions involved actions by union trust funds or
multi-employer health benefit plans, which had to pay the elevated expenses
of their insureds or of covered employees.75 Similar theories were asserted in
actions brought by two groups of hospitals that provided care to smokers, but
which were then not reimbursed by their nonpaying patients.76 In virtually all

of these cases, the courts have dismissed the claims, concluding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.7

72. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
73. "Ve assume, arguendo, that Albrecht correctly held that vertical, maximum price fixing is
subject to the per se rule." Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 335 n.5.
74. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997).
75. See, e.g., Lyons v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2000); Tex. Carpenters Health
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000); Int'l Bhd. ofTeamsters, Local 734 Health
& Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1999); Laborers Local 17 Health &
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1080 (2000); Or.
Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1075 (2000); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171
F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000); R.I. Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.R.I. 2000). See generally Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up In Smoke:
How the Proximate Cause Battle Extinguished The Tobacco War, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 257 (2000).
76. Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 241 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001); Allegheny
Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000).
77. Plaintiffs have been only marginally more successful with their antitrust claims in a handful of
district court cases. In Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. PhilipMorris, Inc., 83 F.
Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 1999), the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to proceed with a Sherman Act
claim, but then dismissed it both for a failure to show antitrust injury and on the merits. In Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. PhilipMorris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), as amended sub nom.
NationalAsbestos Workers Medical Fund v. PhilipMorris,Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), the
court held that plaintiffs had standing to proceed with claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
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Although these decisions have recognized the harm suffered by the
plaintiffs, and in several cases have even noted that the defendants' conduct
was both intentional and the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, these
courts nonetheless have refused to allow these claims to proceed. Perhaps
paralyzed by the scope of potential litigation and the consequent burden on the
judicial system, the decisions have focused on two factors mentioned in
78 the extent to which the damages claims
AssociatedGeneralContractors,
are
speculative and the likelihood that they would require complex calculation, as
sufficient to justify dismissal of these claims.
One can justifiably lament the potential imposition on the resources of the
federal judiciary from litigation of these claims, or could say that these issues
are better resolved legislatively. But, given the courts' recognition that the
plaintiffs were directly harmed by the tobacco companies' alleged antitrust
violations, it is even more lamentable that these enforcement doctrines were
used to cut off these claims, before courts ever reached the merits.
Another troubling recent case is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lucas
Automotive Engineering,Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc.79 The plaintiff,
Lucas, and the defendant, Coker, were distributors and suppliers of original
equipment major brand vintage tires."0 Coker, by far the larger company, had
been the exclusive distributor of all major brands except Firestone, for which
Lucas also had had distributional rights, and Goodyear, which accounted for
only ten percent of this market, and which was distributed by an unrelated
third company. 8 Coker then entered into a contract with Firestone to acquire
its vintage tire molds and worldwide distribution rights, the result of which
was to foreclose Lucas' ability to purchase Firestone tires from sources other
than Coker or Coker's distributors.82
Lucas brought a lawsuit challenging the transaction under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 3 It asserted antitrust injury
and standing both as a competitor and customer of Coker.84 In affirming the
district court's dismissal of Lucas' claim for treble damages, the Ninth Circuit

Organizations Act (RICO), and dismissed the antitrust claim because RICO's theory and remedies were
preferable for the plaintiffs.
78. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
79. 140 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 1230.
81. Id. at 1230-31.
82. Id. This contract gave Coker control over seventy-five percent of the vintage tire market and
ninety percent of the original equipment market. id.
83. Id. at 1231.
84. Id.

2001]

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

analogized this situation to Brunswick;" it found an absence of antitrust injury
because "Lucas... would have suffered the same injury had a small business
acquired the exclusive right to manufacture and to distribute Firestone tires."86
The court's conclusion failed to recognize that the plaintiff s substantive
claims depended on the defendant's large market share and market power,
coupled with the substantial barriers to entry into the market. The
hypothetical acquisition by a smaller company would not have facilitated
monopolization of that market, nor would the acquisition have violated
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. And, because the overall market for vintage
tires would have been significantly different (and more competitive) if the
defendant were not such a dominant force in that market, the plaintiff might
well have had other opportunities to continue as a tire distributor had that
same contract been entered into by a smaller firm.87 By contrast, the increased
power that Lucas obtained through the contract with Firestone enhanced its
ability to limit output and/or raise prices to the detriment of the consuming
public.88
What conclusions can be drawn, and what suggestions can be made, by
an examination of these decisions? The problem lies both with the articulated
standards for antitrust injury and standing and the application of these tests to
specific situations. As a beginning, I would modify the antitrust injury rule,
to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim for any per se violation of the antitrust

85. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1986). Brunswick, which was one
of the two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment, acquired the assets of several insolvent bowling
centers. Id. at 479. The plaintiffs, who were competitors of the acquired bowling centers, alleged that these
acquisitions violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. The Supreme Court dismissed the claims, first
noting that the plaintiffs' gravamen was that they were hurt by the preservation of competition, which
would otherwise have been eliminated had the insolvent centers gone out of business, and then pointing out
that the plaintiffs would have suffered the same "harm" had those centers been acquired by other entities.
Id. at 485.
86. Lucas, 140 F.3d at 1233. In a divided portion of the opinion, two members of the panel, while
agreeing that Lucas could not pursue its claim for treble damages, concluded that it did have standing under
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, in its capacity as a customer at the distributional level, to seek injunctive
relief against the acquisition. Id. at 1235-57.
87. The court also held that the Illinois Brick rule precluded standing by Lucas to assert a claim for
treble damages, as a downstream purchaser of vintage tires, since it no longer bought tires from Coker, but
only from one of Coker's distributors. Id. at 1234. The court recognized that the Supreme Court had only
applied Illinois Brick to cases arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but concluded that its remsoning
should also apply to Clayton Section 7 claims. Id. at 1233.34. There was no recognition that Lucas was
relegated to the status of an indirect purchaser from Coker because Coker refused to sell to the plaintiff.
88. See generally William Page, Optimal Antitrust Penaltiesand Competitors' Injury, 80 MICH.
L. REv.2151 (1990).
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laws, unless the defendant could identify another person whose harm was
more clearly the result of the competition-reducing aspect of the unlawful
conduct, and who was actually ready to bring a treble damage action. I would
modify the standing rules, to remove the present limitation on actions by a
"good" plaintiff, i.e., one who did suffer identifiable harm, merely because the
defendant has been able to identify "better," i.e., more directly harmed,
plaintiffs. Finally, the "indirect purchaser" rule announced in Illinois Brick
has had serious adverse effects on private enforcement and it should be
reversed,89 either by the Supreme Court or by the Congress.
I begin by reemphasizing the importance of private enforcement of the
antitrust laws." Furthermore, the role of the private bar has become even
more important over the past two decades because of the redirected focus of
governmental enforcement. 9 Therefore, I urge three steps. First, the Supreme
Court has not examined antitrust injury in over a decade, and its last antitrust
standing decision was almost twenty years ago.92 Its failure to consider these
issues more recently is certainly not for lack of opportunity. I would hope that
the Court would relax its presently overly-restrictive antitrust injury and
standing requirements hopefully along the lines suggested above. At a
minimum, the Court should indicate to the lower federal courts that they have
gone too far in denying private plaintiffs the opportunity to recover treble
damages. Second, I express what I fear may be, in the presentjudicial climate,
a forlorn hope, that the courts of appeals and district courts would recognize
the value of private enforcement, and would alter their all-too-frequent refusal
to allow such actions to proceed. Finally, I hope that more academics and
practicing attorneys will address these problems, arguing for a reinvigoration
of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.

89. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
91. With the exception of a handful of well-publicized cases, including actions against Microsoft,
American Airlines and Mastercharge and VISA, today the bulk of governmental enforcement efforts consist
of challenges to price-fixing agreements and certain horizontal mergers.
92. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

